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ABSTRACT 
This article examines the position of Joseph Ratzinger with regard to the classical question in the 
field of the theology of religions, the salvation of non-Christians. In criticism of a recent book by 
Ambrose Mong, it is argued that Ratzinger is not a soteriological exclusivist but an optimistic 
restrictivist inclusivist. As explained by Gavin DʼCosta, restrictivist inclusivists allow for the 
salvation of non-Christians, though they do not regard non-Christian religions as salvific 
structures per se. While restricting the salvific activity of God to the human conscience or certain 
positive elements in non-Christian cultures, this kind of an inclusivist may still be a 
soteriological optimist, as proves to be the case with Ratzinger. Having examined the subjective 
and objective aspects of Ratzingerʼs inclusivism, namely the concepts of conscience and 
Stellvertretung (vicarious representation), the article shows that in the 2007 encyclical Spe Salvi 
the two lines of thought are combined by Pope Benedict XVI in a reinterpretation of the doctrine 









 In1 his 2015 book Are Non-Christians Saved? Joseph Ratzingerʼs Thoughts on Religious 
Pluralism, Ambrose Mong touches on the classical question in the field of the theology of 
religions from the perspective of the thought of Joseph Ratzinger, also known as Pope Benedict 
XVI.2 Can non-Christians be saved? Where should Joseph Ratzinger be situated with regard to 
the three standard alternatives of exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism? Surprisingly, despite 
Ratzingerʼs well-known interest in the theology of religions, this aspect of his thought has 
received remarkably little scholarly attention prior to Mong.3 On the other hand, the scarcity of 
                                                          
1 I would like to thank the Utrecht Network for the Young Researchers grant that enabled me to 
work on this article in November 2016 at the University of Malta. In addition to the Faculty of 
Theology of the University of Malta, especially Dr John Berry, I would also like to thank the 
Faculty of Theology of the University of Navarra, especially Dr Pablo Blanco, as well as Dr 
Oskari Juurikkala, Dr Jyri Komulainen, and prof. Miikka Ruokanen (University of Helsinki), for 
their invaluable comments, criticisms, and encouragement. 
2 Ambrose Mong, Are Non-Christians Saved? Joseph Ratzingerʼs Thoughts on Religious 
Pluralism (London: Oneworld Publications, 2015). Mong is a Dominican priest based in Hong 
Kong. 
3 Some of the standard introductions to Ratzingerʼs theology ignore the question altogether, 
while others touch on it only implicitly or in passing. For examples of the latter, see Vincent 
Twomey, Pope Benedict XVI: The Conscience of Our Age: A Theological Portrait (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007), p. 55; Aidan Nichols OP, The Thought of Pope Benedict XVI: 
An Introduction to the Theology of Joseph Ratzinger (London: Burns & Oates, 2007), pp. 108–
109; James Corkery, S.J., Joseph Ratzingerʼs Theological Ideas: Wise Cautions and Legitimate 
academic interest in the topic is understandable in the light of Ratzingerʼs explicit criticism of 
the traditional way of posing the question. In Truth and Tolerance: Christian Belief and World 
Religions, Ratzinger is emphatic that the question of religions should not be reduced to the 
question of salvation, and vice versa.4 
 Nonetheless, Ratzinger does in fact address the issue on several occasions. Although the 
dispute between exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism was not the main concern in Truth and 
Tolerance, Ratzinger realised that ʻthe questions raised will nonetheless be with us all alongʼ.5 
Ratzingerʼs attitude mirrors the wider situation in the study of the theology of religions: while 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Hopes (New York: Paulist Press, 2009), pp. 62, 154; Pablo Blanco Sarto, La Teología de Joseph 
Ratzinger, Una Introducción, Palabra, 2011), pp. 379–381. For the best treatment so far, see 
Christopher Ruddy, ʻ“For the Many”: The Vicarious-Representative Heart of Joseph Ratzingerʼs 
Theology,ʼ Theological Studies 75 (2014), pp. 564–584. However, in Ruddyʼs article the 
salvation of non-Christians is only one of the subtopics examined in light of ʻvicarious 
representation.ʼ 
4 Joseph Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance: Christian Belief and World Religions, trans. Henry 
Taylor (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), p. 53. This is noted by Blanco Sarto, La Teología, 
pp. 371–372; Nichols, Pope Benedict XVI, p. 207; Rocco Viviano, The Theological-
Ecclesiological Thought of Benedict XVI (2005–2013) on the Christian Engagement with the 
Religions in the Context of the Modern Papacy (London: Heythrop College, 2013) pp. 206–207. 
http://www.heythrop.ac.uk/sites/default/files/docs/publications/theses/Rocco%20PhD%20Thesis.
compressed.pdf 
5 Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, p. 53. 
the standard typology is criticized and provided with alternatives,6 it still continues to be 
employed as a helpful analytic tool. For example, Paul Griffiths and Gavin DʼCosta, the two 
scholars referred to by Mong in his analysis of the topic, have recently differentiated between 
various kinds of exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism, refining the traditional typology and 
enabling greater analytic precision.7  
 Griffiths and DʼCostaʼs paradigms will serve as a point of reference in this article, which 
aims at reliably locating Joseph Ratzinger on the exclusivist-inclusivist-pluralist map from the 
point of view of soteriology, i.e. the question of whether non-Christians can be saved and how. 
In criticism of Ambrose Mong, it will be argued that Ratzinger is an optimistic restrictivist 
inclusivist. Furthermore, in addition to a simple classification, the analysis of Ratzingerʼs 
writings will bring to light the specific structure of Ratzingerʼs soteriological inclusivism, which 
includes both a subjective and an objective aspect as well as a present and a future dimension. 
Thus, in spite of his reservations, Ratzinger/Benedict XVI is shown to offer a rather 
comprehensive inclusivist theory to the discernment of the theological and ecclesial 
communities. 
 
Ratzinger the Soteriological Exclusivist? 
   
                                                          
6 See, for example, J. A. DiNoia, O.P., The Diversity of Religions: A Christian Perspective 
(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1992), pp. 34–64. 
7 Paul Griffiths, Problems of Religious Diversity (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2001), 53–64; Gavin 
DʼCosta, Christianity and World Religions: Disputed Questions in the Theology of Religions 
(Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 6–7. 
Regardless of its title, only a relatively short section of Ambrose Mongʼs book explicitly deals 
with the question of Ratzingerʼs position with regard to the salvation of non-Christians.8 In 
Mongʼs own words, he ʻseeks to show that Ratzingerʼs perception of non-Christian religions as 
valid paths to salvation is essentially pessimistic and negative. He believes that there may be 
revelation in these religions but not salvationʼ.9 With regard to the question of salvation, Mong 
claims that Ratzinger ʻbelieves that faith in Jesus Christ is the only way to salvationʼ, which 
makes him ʻan exclusivistʼ.10 On the other hand, with regard to the question of truth (which 
Mong equates with ʻrevelationʼ), Ratzinger reveals an ʻopen inclusivism in which he 
acknowledges that truths found in non-Christian religions may be of significance for the 
churchʼ.11  
                                                          
8 Mong, Non-Christians, pp. 22–43, i.e. chapter two. The rest of the book deals with various 
related aspects of Ratzingerʼs theology, including ecclesiology and ecumenism, as well as 
official investigations of theologians (such as Jacques Dupuis and Tissa Balasuriya) when 
Ratzinger was the prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. The dissonance 
between the title and the contents may be related to the fact that substantially the same book was 
published in the United States under another title, Dialogue Derailed: Joseph Ratzingerʼs War 
against Pluralist Theology (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2015). 
9 Mong, Non-Christians, p. 22. 
10 Ibid., p. 30. 
11 Ibid., p. 23. 
 Both the term ʻopen inclusivismʼ and the important distinction between the categories of 
truth and salvation are found in the work of Paul Griffiths.12 Mong is correct in associating 
Ratzinger with the ʻopen inclusivismʼ advocated by Griffiths, as opposed to a ʻclosed 
inclusivismʼ which would hold that ʻall alien religious truths (should there be any) are already 
known to and explicitly taught by the home religion in some formʼ.13 Mong is also correct in 
associating Ratzinger with Gavin DʼCostaʼs category of ʻrestrictivist inclusivistsʼ, as opposed to 
ʻstructural inclusivistsʼ, but this also marks the beginning of much confusion, for neither DʼCosta 
nor Mong keep clear the distinction recalled by Griffiths between the separate issues of truth and 
salvation.14 
                                                          
12 Griffiths, Religious Diversity, p. 54, 59–64. Griffiths is emphatic that he only concerns himself 
with the question about truth, not the question about salvation.  
13 Ibid., p. 59. See Mong, Non-Christians, pp. 23, 31. However, Mong is wrong in equating the 
concepts of truth and revelation. Ratzinger does not speak of divine revelation in other religions. 
On the contrary, in his farewell speech to the parish priests and clergy of Rome in 2013, Pope 
Benedict XVI distinguishes between the one true word of God in the incarnate Christ and truths 
discovered through ʻreligious experienceʼ, and a ʻcertain human light from creationʼ in other 
religions. See Pope Benedict XVI, Meeting with the parish priests and the clergy of Rome (14 
Feb 2013), available at http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-
xvi/en/speeches/2013/february/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20130214_clero-roma.html. 
14 Confusingly, Mong, Non-Christians, pp. 30–31, states that Ratzinger is ʻin one senseʼ (what 
sense?) closer to the restrictivist inclusivists, while ʻin another senseʼ he is closer to open 
inclusivism. But these two positions are not alternatives in the same system. It would be fully 
 DʼCosta explains the difference between the two forms of inclusivism as follows:  
 
(a) Structural inclusivists hold that Christ is the normative revelation of God, although salvation 
is possible outside of the explicit Christian church. Salvation is, or may be, available through 
other religions per se, but this salvation is always from Christ. . . . (b) Restrictivist inclusivists 
hold that Christ is the normative revelation of God, although salvation is possible outside of the 
explicit Christian church, but this does not give legitimation to other religions as possible or 
actual salvific structures. These theologians are careful to restrict the sense of Godʼs 
inclusiveness to people and elements of their culture, but not their religions per se. In both, 
Christ is ontologically and causally exclusive to salvation, but not necessarily 
epistemologically.15 
 
In this definition, the emphasis is clearly on the question of salvation, although Christ is initially 
described as the ʻnormative revelationʼ, rather than, say, the ʻunique saviourʼ, which would be 
preferable. In any case, by associating Ratzinger with restrictivist inclusivists Mong greatly 
confounds the reader, for his emphatic main thesis is that Ratzinger is a soteriological 
exclusivist, whereas Ratzingerʼs inclusivism is supposed to extend only to the question of truth 
or revelation.16 
 But what evidence does Mong provide for his main thesis? Paradoxically, the text at the 
heart of Mongʼs analysis not only fails to support the case of exclusivism but also contains an 
explicit rejection of it. In a sermon delivered during Advent in 1964, Ratzinger said: ʻThe 
question we have to face is not that of whether other people can be saved and how. We are 
convinced that God is able to do this. . . and that we do not need to help him do it with our 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
correct to say that Ratzinger is both an open inclusivist (in Griffithsʼ terms) and a restrictivist 
inclusivist (in DʼCostaʼs terms). 
15 DʼCosta, Christianity and World Religions, p. 7. 
16 Mong, Non-Christians, pp. 22, 30, 32. 
cogitations.ʼ17 True, the sermon contains an awareness of the challenge of religious pluralism 
and a defence of mission, but the motivation for the latter is precisely not ʻthat all might be saved 
through the Christian gospelʼ18 but simply the fact that to be Christian is to break out of egoism 
and serve others.19 The entire starting point of the sermon is the modern conviction that there are 
ʻmany other ways to heaven and to salvationʼ,20 and the inclusivist substance of the conviction is 
fundamentally shared, not disputed, by the preacher.21 Similarly, Dominus Iesus and Truth and 
Tolerance, both of which Mong refers to loosely, actually affirm soteriological inclusivism, not 
exclusivism.22 In Truth and Tolerance, Ratzingerʼs exclusion of soteriological exclusivism is 
                                                          
17 Cited in Mong, Non-Christians, p. 26. The entire sermon is found in Joseph Ratzinger, What It 
Means to Be a Christian, trans. Henry Taylor (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), pp. 43–62.  
18 Cf. Mong, Non-Christians, p. 26.  
19 Ratzinger, What It Means, pp.  54–55, 62. 
20 Ratzinger, What It Means, p. 46.  
21 Ratzinger begins the sermon with the soteriologically exclusivist meditation of St. Ignatius of 
Loyola and comments that today we would be unable to replicate it: ʻEverything we believe 
about God, and everything we know about man, prevents us from accepting that beyond the 
limits of the Church there is no more salvation. . . ʼ (p. 45) At the end, Ratzinger reformulates 
Ignatiusʼ meditation, expressly dropping the exclusivist dimension: ʻYet beyond what Ignatius 
suggests, nowadays we will include the insight that Godʼs mercy, made manifest in Christ, is 
sufficiently abundant for everyone.ʼ (p. 62) 
22 For Dominus Iesus, which Ratzinger signed but did not personally author, see Congregation 
for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration ʻDominus Iesusʼ on the unicity and salvific 
universality of Jesus Christ and the Church (August 6, 2000), 20–21. The full text is available at 
clear from the very outset: ʻProbably no one today takes the position of exclusivism in the sense 
of denying salvation to all non-Christians.ʼ23 For Ratzinger, the only remaining options are 
ʻinclusivism and pluralismʼ,24 and since the main thrust of the book consists in a criticism of 
pluralism, it should be evident that Ratzinger falls into the broad category of inclusivism.25 
 In sum, Mongʼs analysis with regard to the question of the salvation of non-Christians 
according to Joseph Ratzinger is, to borrow a famous phrase from Dominus Iesus, ʻgravely 
deficientʼ.26 It is not consistent in distinguishing between the issues of truth and salvation, and in 
the case of the latter, it places Ratzinger in the wrong category. Consequently, a reliable analysis 
of the most relevant Ratzingerian texts on topic of the salvation of non-Christians is called for, in 
order to determine the precise characteristics of Ratzingerʼs soteriological inclusivism. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_2000080
6_dominus-iesus_en.html. For Truth and Tolerance, see below. 
23 Joseph Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance,  p. 80.  
24 Ibid. 
25 The reason Ratzinger does not explicitly characterise his position as inclusivist seems to be the 
fact that he regards Karl Rahnerʼs theory of ʻanonymous Christians,ʼ with which he disagrees, as 
the paradigmatic example of inclusivism. See Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, pp. 17, 51; Joseph 
Ratzinger, Principles of Catholic Theology: Building Stones for a Fundamental Theology, trans. 
Sister Mary Frances McCarthy, S.N.D. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987), pp. 161–171. What 
is needed is precisely the sort of distinction DʼCosta has made between structural and restrictivist 
inclusivism. 
26 See DI 22. This is by no means to discredit the entirety of Mongʼs work, which I consider 
valuable in many other respects. 
 Ratzingerʼs Soteriological Inclusivism 
 
As Christopher Ruddy has recently pointed out, Ratzingerʼs concern for the question of the 
salvation of non-Christians emerged as early as the late 1950s.27 His most systematic treatment 
of the salvation of non-Christians is found in the 1969 book Das neue Volk Gottes, in an article 
titled ʻKein Heil außerhalb der Kirche?ʼ (ʻNo Salvation Outside the Church?ʼ).28 There, 
Ratzinger first traces the history of the old axiom, extra ecclesiam nulla salus est, from the Bible 
and the Fathers through the Council of Florence and the Jansenist controversy to popes Pius IX 
and Pius XII, culminating in the teaching of Vatican II.29 He then approaches the topic of the 
salvation of non-Christians from two angles, considering what he calls the subjective and 
objective aspects of the question. The subjective aspect has to do with the silent call of God to 
faith and love present in the individual conscience, enabling self-transcendence and salvation. 
                                                          
27 Ruddy, ʻFor the Many,ʼ p. 575. This is a time in which the Catholic understanding of the 
salvation of non-Christians is witnessing a significant theological development, led by 
ressourcement theologians such as Henri de Lubac and Yves Congar. In Stephen Bullivant, The 
Salvation of Atheists and Catholic Dogmatic Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
pp. 51, 74, Ratzinger is rightly placed in the same camp with these famous inclusivists. 
28 Joseph Ratzinger, Das neue Volk Gottes. Entwürfe zur Ekklesiologie (Düsseldorf: Patmos, 
1977 [1969]), pp. 152–177. Only parts of it have been translated into English in The Ratzinger 
Reader: Mapping a Theological Journey, ed. Lieven Boeve & Gerard Mannion (London: T&T 
Clark, 2010), pp. 154–159. 
29 Ratzinger, Das neue Volk Gottes, pp. 154–166. 
The objective aspect refers to the Stellvertretung or ʻvicarious representationʼ of Christ and his 
ecclesial body for the entirety of humankind. Since both of these lines of thought represent 
original and lasting insights in Ratzingerʼs soteriological inclusivism, they will be given detailed 
consideration. 
 
The Subjective Aspect: Conscience, Faith and Love 
 
The importance of the concept of conscience to Ratzingerʼs thinking is well illustrated by the 
fact that an entire portrait of his theology has been written from this perspective.30 Yet, even 
when the relevance of the idea of conscience for Ratzingerʼs theology of religions has otherwise 
been noted, very little attention has been paid to the role that the concept plays in Ratzingerʼs 
soteriological inclusivism.31 Arguably, referring to the silent presence and call of God in the 
human conscience is Ratzingerʼs most consistent way of approaching the question of the 
salvation of non-Christians. Importantly for the theology of religions, this approach does not 
exclude the possibility that the various religious traditions might also contain elements of 
soteriological significance. 
                                                          
30 See Twomey, Conscience of Our Age.  
31 See Nichols, The Thought of Pope Benedict, p. 209; Twomey, Conscience of Our Age, pp. 55, 
131–2; Blanco Sarto, La Teología, pp. 176–181, 331–336. 
 In ʻKein Heil außerhalb der Kirche?ʼ Ratzinger says that the New Testament provides 
two basic answers on how to reach salvation: ʻlove alone sufficesʼ and ʻonly faith sufficesʼ.32 
Despite an apparent contrast, these two ways actually belong together. Both faith and love 
express ʻan attitude of self-transcendence, in which the human being begins to leave his egoism 
behind and to go forth toward the otherʼ. In this exodus, even non-Christian religions can be of 
assistance. Ratzinger states that ʻmany of the realities of the current religious and profane order 
can become a call to and a help in the saving exodus of self-transcendenceʼ, as long as they serve 
ʻlove and faithʼ. ʻThe religions assist in salvation according to the extent to which they lead to 
this attitude; they hinder salvation according to the extent to which they hinder this attitude in the 
human being.ʼ From this perspective, ʻone is just as likely to encounter a false dismissal of 
religion and religions as to encounter a false glorificationʼ.33 
 Ratzinger is clear in distancing himself from the positions that later became known as 
exclusivism and pluralism. Combating the latter, Ratzinger opposes the ʻwidespread notion that 
says that everyone should live according to their convictions and will be saved based on the 
“conscientiousness” that they thereby demonstrate.ʼ34 Here, Ratzinger introduces an argument 
that he will repeat in various works: 
 
How? Should, for example, the heroism of the SS man, the terrible fidelity of his perverted 
allegiance, be considered a kind of “Votum ecclesiae?” Never! . . . Conscience degenerates into 
                                                          
32 Ratzinger, Das neue Volk Gottes, p. 169–170. Reference is made to Mt 22:35–40, Mt 25:31–
46, Rom 13:9ff for the first answer and Paulʼs doctrine of faith as well as the theme of the ʻpoor 
in spiritʼ for the second answer. 
33 ʻNo Salvation Outside the Church?ʼ in The Ratzinger Reader, pp. 155–156. 
34 Ibid., p. 156. 
conscientiousness; the current system becomes the “way to salvation.” It sounds humane and 
broad-minded when one therefore says, a Muslim should, in order [to] be saved, just be a “good 
Muslim” (what does that actually mean?), a Hindu should be a good Hindu, and so on. But then, 
should one not likewise say that a cannibal should just be a good cannibal and a convinced SS 
man a thoroughgoing SS man?35 
 
 
This discussion leads to the all-important distinction between two concepts of conscience: 
 
The statement that each should live according to his conscience is itself—obviously—completely 
correct. The only question is what one understands by “conscience.” If one uses conscience to 
justify staying faithfully in the current system, then “conscience” is evidently not being used to 
refer to the call of God common to all, but rather to a social reflex, the superego of the respective 
group. . . . Conscience itself . . . surely cannot say something different to each person: that one 
must be a Hindu, the other a Muslim, another a cannibal. . . Living according to conscience does 
not mean enclosing oneself in oneʼs so-called convictions, but following this call that is made to 
every person: the call to faith and love.36 
 
At this point some of the fundamental features of what Gavin DʼCosta calls restrictivist 
inclusivism are evident. The religions are not salvific structures as such, but followers of non-
                                                          
35 Ibid. For the personal background of this argument, see Joseph Ratzinger, On Conscience (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007), p. 17. For different versions of the argument in later writings, 
see Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, pp. 201–207; Joseph Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth: From the 
Baptism in the Jordan to the Transfiguration, (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2008), p. 92. 
36 ʻNo Salvation Outside the Church?ʼ in The Ratzinger Reader, pp. 156. For a development on 
the two levels of conscience and moral responsibility, see Ratzinger, On Conscience, pp. 30–38. 
See also Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, p. 206; Twomey, Conscience of Our Age, pp. 122–7; 
Nichols, Pope Benedict XVI, pp. 221–2; Peter Casarella, ʻCulture and Conscienceʼ, in 
Explorations in the Theology of Benedict XVI, ed. John C. Cavadini (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2012), pp. 63–86, at p. 71. 
Christian religions can be saved by heeding the call of their conscience to faith and love. In this 
process, elements in the various non-Christian cultures or religions can help.37 Alongside a more 
forceful emphasis on truth, Ratzinger repeats these fundamental convictions on several occasions 
around the turn of the millennium, at the height of his involvement in disputes concerning the 
theology of religions. 
 For example, in his presentation of Dominus Iesus in 2000, Cardinal Ratzinger offers an 
interpretation of John Paul IIʼs words in the 1990 encyclical Redemptoris Missio which mention 
the Spiritʼs work ʻnot only in human hearts, but also in religionsʼ.38 Ratzinger comments: ʻThe 
good that is present in the various religions offers paths toward salvation and does so as part of 
the activity of the Spirit in Christ, but the religions themselves do not.ʼ39 In Truth and Tolerance, 
Ratzinger similarly says that ʻsalvation does not lie in religions as such, but it is connected to 
them, inasmuch as, and to the extent that, they lead man toward the search for God, for truth, and 
for loveʼ.40 Reflecting on Rom. 2:14–15, Ratzinger says that it is not so much in the religions as 
                                                          
37 While DʼCostaʼs definition of restrictivist inclusivism only mentions elements of cultures, not 
religions, nothing would be lost by including elements of religions in the definition as well, since 
it is anyhow excluded that the religions as such function as salvific structures. Here it might be 
recalled that in Truth and Tolerance, p. 59, Ratzinger says: ʻIn all known historical cultures, 
religion is an essential element of culture.ʼ 
38 Joseph Ratzinger, ʻPresentation of the Declaration Dominus Iesus,ʼ in Joseph Ratzinger, 
Pilgrim Fellowship of Faith: The Church as Communion (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005), 
pp. 209–216 at p. 213.  
39 Ibid., pp. 213–214. 
40 Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, p. 205. 
it is in the conscience that all people can hear the voice of the one true good, one true God, and 
thus ʻtranscend what is merely subjective in order to turn toward each other and toward God; 
And that is salvationʼ.41 Finally, in the first volume of Jesus of Nazareth, Ratzinger again speaks 
of the ʻsalvation of those who do not know Christʼ, and, based on the Beatitudes, argues that the 
ʻpath that lies open to everyoneʼ is not simply to follow their religions but to ʻhunger and thirst 
for righteousnessʼ, to become inwardly attentive to Godʼs silent exhortation, ʻwhich is present in 
usʼ. This way ʻfinds its destination in Jesus Christʼ.42 
 Based on the above, it can be concluded that Ratzinger strongly resists pluralist and 
structural inclusivist attempts at making religious systems salvific as such, preferring to locate 
Godʼs salvific action in the human conscience that can always hear the silent call to faith, truth 
and love. On the other hand, it would be misleading to say without qualification that Ratzinger 
ʻinsists that [non-Christian religions] are not vehicles of salvationʼ,43 because to a certain degree 
and in a certain sense they can be. This is already evident from what has been quoted above, but 
it is most explicit in the 1996 interview Salt of the Earth, where Ratzinger also reveals his 
personal optimism about the frequency of such an occurrence: ʻIt is definitely possible for 
someone to receive from his religion directives that help him become a pure person, which also, 
if we want to use the word, help him to please God and reach salvation. This is not at all 
excluded by what I said; on the contrary, this undoubtedly happens on a large scale.ʼ44 Towards 
                                                          
41 Ibid., pp. 206–207. 
42 Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth, p. 92. 
43 Mong, Non-Christians, p. 43. 
44 Joseph Ratzinger, Salt of the Earth: The Church at the End of the Millennium, trans. Adrian 
Walker (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997), p. 24.  
the end of the same book, Ratzinger says that the Christian can find ʻa secret working of Godʼ 
behind non-Christian religions, so that ʻthrough the other religions God touches man and brings 
him onto the path. But it is always the same God, the God of Jesus Christ.ʼ45 
 Consequently, although critical of pluralism and restrictivist as an inclusivist, Ratzinger 
is quite optimistic about the salvation of non-Christians and even about the salvific work of God 
through other religions. The key to appreciating this is the role Ratzinger assigns to conscience 
as the point of encounter with the one true God, present in all men of all religions. It is the 
ʻdynamic of the conscience and of the silent presence of God in it that is leading religions toward 
one another and guiding people onto the path of Godʼ.46  
 
The Objective Aspect: Vicarious Representation 
                                                          
45 Ibid., p. 259. If both are rightly interpreted, Ratzingerʼs position is well in line with Dialogue 
and Proclamation, the 1991 document of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue. With 
reference to the Vatican II decree Ad Gentes (AG), the document states: ʻThe mystery of 
salvation reaches out to them, in a way known to God, through the invisible action of the Spirit 
of Christ. Concretely, it will be in the sincere practice of what is good in their own religious 
traditions and by following the dictates of their conscience that the members of other religions 
respond positively to Godʼs invitation and receive salvation in Jesus Christ, even while they do 
not recognize or acknowledge him as their saviour (cf. AG 3,9,11).ʼ Dialogue and Proclamation, 
29. The full text is available at 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/interelg/documents/rc_pc_interelg_doc_
19051991_dialogue-and-proclamatio_en.html 
46 Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance, 54. 
 At this point, it is easy to anticipate objections to Ratzingerʼs position. In general, the Protestant 
tradition would raise doubts about salvation by works and ask whether it is not true that all fall 
short and stand in the need of Christ the mediator. The Catholic tradition, in turn, would inquire 
about the necessity of the Church and the sacraments for salvation. 
 Ratzinger includes both concerns in his elaboration of the concept of Stellvertretung, best 
translated as ʻvicarious representationʼ.47 Christopher Ruddy has argued that this concept 
represents the heart of Ratzingerʼs theology, shedding light on his vision of salvation history, 
christology, soteriology, and ecclesiology.48 Yet, most commenters have not paid detailed 
attention to the idea,49 and even fewer have recognized its implications for soteriological 
inclusivism.50 Ratzingerʼs most comprehensive analysis of the topic is found in an article titled 
ʻStellvertretungʼ, in Handbuch theologischer Grundbegriffe, written in 1959–1963, but only 
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published in English in 2011.51 This article also serves as the source for Ratzingerʼs treatment of 
the objective aspect of the salvation of non-Christians in ʻKein Heil außerhalb der Kirche?ʼ52    
 Ratzinger believes that vicarious representation is ʻa fundamental category of biblical 
revelationʼ, evident in the Old Testament already in the story of Abraham in Gen. 18:20ff and 
reaching its ʻhighpoint in the image of Moses in Deuteronomy and in the Songs of the Lordʼs 
Servant in Deutero-Isaiahʼ, which in turn provides the link with the New Testament and the 
figure of Jesus: ʻFrom him New Testament theology is first and foremost a theology of vicarious 
representation.ʼ53 
 This has consequences for Christian existence as a whole:  
 
With his baptism, Jesus takes on the mission of the Servant and from then on his whole life is 
existence for others, which reaches its completion in the baptism of his death. . . At the Last 
Supper, he interprets his whole earthly life through the Isaian theme of service “for the many”. . . 
Since this eucharistic meal will become the integrating centre of the Christian community and 
give Christian living its fundamental qualification, both of these have as a consequence their 
deepest meaning in the mystery of vicarious representation. Christians live first of all totally 
from the Lordʼs service of representation and at the same time they receive it as the basic law of 
their own being.54 
  
 
Ratzinger then traces the New Testament theology of vicarious representation as found in 
Pauline and Johannine writings, especially in Paulʼs treatment of the Stellvertretung of Jews and 
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Gentiles in Rom. 9–11, as well as his theology of the two Adams. Having pointed to the 
Augustinian notion of Christus totus, caput et membra and the motif of Alexandrian theology 
where the church senses itself oriented beyond itself toward the whole of humanity, Ratzinger 
says that the doctrine of vicarious representation is again gaining influence because of Karl 
Barthʼs important interpretation of Romans 9–11.55  
 For Ratzinger, Stellvertretung can give new meaning to ideas that today seem ʻhardly 
tenableʼ, such as ʻthe notion of no salvation outside the churchʼ. ʻChristians of today will surely 
not hold stubbornly that they alone can attain salvation.ʼ With the concept of vicarious 
representation, the necessity of the church for salvation can be understood ʻin a fresh wayʼ, 
realizing that ʻin the body of humanity there are necessary works of service, which while not 
being required of all are nonetheless necessary for all, since all live from themʼ. Being Christian 
is ʻbeing-for-the-othersʼ, carrying out a service whose greatness is not in ʻour being saved while 
the others are lostʼ but in the fact that ʻthe others also reach salvation through this our service!ʼ 
Christians will no longer worry about the brevity of the Christian era or the fact that the Christian 
message has only reached a fraction of humanity: ʻFor the church to be the means of salvation 
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for all, it does not have to extend itself visibly to all. . . the church is the little flock, through 
which God however intends to save “the many”.ʼ56 
 Having explained the basic structure of the notion, Ratzinger dispels suspicions of 
universalism or apokatastasis with an elucidation of the relationship between the subjective and 
objective aspects of his inclusivist theory. The answer also addresses the relationship between 
the doctrine of grace and the idea of a votum ecclesiae, which in its vulgar form (understood as 
ʻsome kind of good faith or sincerityʼ) Ratzinger calls ʻsemi-pelagianʼ: 
 
It is also clear that the salvation arising in virtue of vicarious representation does not arrive 
mechanically in a person, but requires in the recipient some kind of openness and readiness. . . A 
Pauline type of pistis [faith] must be somehow present, but we do not have to determine in detail 
what this could be. One might even speak of this attitude of openness as a votum ecclesiae 
[desire of being in the church], but one must not forget that this is only the subjective side of a 
totality which only has sense and meaning through the objective reality of the vicarious 
representation of the Christus totus [the whole Christ]. Neglect of this leads to practically 
declaring that human good will is itself the sufficient principle of salvation for the larger portion 
of humanity—which is to surrender the whole doctrine of grace.57 
 
Another possible objection, one that is not addressed in Stellvertretung, is taken up in ʻKein Heil 
außerhalb der Kirche?ʼ Nichols formulates it as follows: If Christ saves the Many through the 
vicarious representation of the Few, ʻwhat is the necessity for the Few to evangelise directly, to 
add to their own number by subtracting from that of the Many?ʼ58 Ratzinger responds by saying 
that the significance of mission is lost ʻif other religions as such are declared to be ways of 
salvationʼ, whereas the doctrine of Stellvertretung is open to the imperative of mission. He 
recalls the axiom so emphatically formulated by Pseudo-Dionysius, bonum diffusivum sui: ʻthe 
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good must of necessity flow out beyond itself; the desire to share belongs intrinsically and 
necessarily to the good as such. . . . The Church too can only fulfil itself in the “diffundere”, in 
the sharing, in the missionary self-transcendence.ʼ59 
 As Twomey and Ruddy have pointed out, the concept of Stellvertretung is especially 
characteristic of Ratzingerʼs early period (late 1950s to late 1960s), although he continues to 
employ it in later decades as well.60 Significantly, however, the inclusivist application of the 
doctrine is absent from Ratzingerʼs major writings on the theology of religions during his 
positions as the prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith and as the Bishop of 
Rome.61 This might be related to the fact that the doctrine of Stellvertretung, especially with its 
inclusivist application, does not have an established status in official Catholic teaching. In 
Ratzingerʼs words, the concept has been ʻlargely relegated to the literature of edification and 
spiritualityʼ and it generally ʻplays only a meager role in theologyʼ.62 However, after a prolonged 
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silence, the idea makes an unexpected return in an interview given in 2015 by the Pope Emeritus 
to Jacques Servais, S.J., and published on March 17, 2016, by the Osservatore Romano.63 The 
interview provides evidence of a remarkable continuity in Ratzingerʼs personal soteriology, 
demonstrating his continued preference for Stellvertretung inclusivism. 
 In the interview, Benedict XVI is emphatic on the Catholic Churchʼs abandonment of 
exclusivism: ʻa profound evolution of dogmaʼ has taken place, where the ʻunderstanding that 
God cannot let go to perdition all the unbaptizedʼ has been ʻfully affirmedʼ since the middle of 
the 20th century, while the contrary has been ʻfinally abandonedʼ after the Second Vatican 
Council. As for the theories regarding the salvation of non-Christians, Benedict first mentions 
Karl Rahnerʼs theory of ʻanonymous Christiansʼ, which he criticizes for reducing the faith ʻto a 
pure conscious presentation of what a human being is in himselfʼ and ʻoverlooking the drama of 
change and renewal that is central to Christianityʼ. After rejecting pluralistic theories as even less 
acceptable, Benedict recalls the concept of vicarious representation, which was reflected upon by 
ʻabove all Henri de Lubac and with him some other theologiansʼ.64 
 
For them the “pro-existence” (“being for”) of Christ would be an expression of the fundamental 
figure of the Christian life and of the Church as such. It is true that the problem is not fully 
resolved, but it seems to me that this, in fact, is the key insight that thus impacts the existence of 
the individual Christian. Christ, as the unique One, was and is for all Christians, who in Paulʼs 
awesome imagery make up Christʼs body in this world and thus participate in this “being-for.” 
Christians, so to speak, are not so for themselves, but are, with Christ, for others. 
 This does not mean having some sort of special ticket for entering into eternal happiness, 
but rather the vocation to build the whole. What the human person needs in order to be saved is a 
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profound openness with regards to God, a profound expectation and acceptance of Him, and this 
correspondingly means that we, together with the Lord whom we have encountered, go towards 
others and seek to make visible to them the advent of God in Christ. 
 It is possible to explain this “being for” in a somewhat more abstract way. It is important 
to mankind that there is truth in it, this is believed and practiced. That one suffers for it. That one 
loves. These realities penetrate with their light into the world as such and support it. 
 I think that in this present situation it becomes for us ever more clear what the Lord said 
to Abraham, that is, that ten righteous men would have been sufficient to save a city, but that it 
destroys itself if such a small number is not reached. It is clear that we need to further reflect on 
the whole question.65 
 
In these personal reflections Benedict XVI reveals his continued support for Stellvertretung: ʻit 
seems to me that this, in fact, is the key insightʼ. At the same time, there is a recognition of the 
controversial or indefinite nature of the proposal, for Benedict admits that the issue ʻis not fully 
resolvedʼ and that ʻwe need to further reflect on the whole questionʼ. This might help explain 
Ratzingerʼs relative silence with regard to ecclesial Stellvertretung in the 1980s–2010s while 
serving as prefect and pope. It seems that Benedict XVI did not consider the theory certain 
enough to be elevated to the status of official teaching. 
 From this perspective, it is all the more interesting to consider one final aspect of 
Ratzingerʼs inclusivist soteriology, namely his interpretation of the doctrine of purgatory. 
Remarkably, what Ratzinger once proposed as a private theologian, Benedict XVI not only 
incorporated into the teaching of a papal encyclical, but also expanded so as to make it 
immediately relevant to the question of the salvation of non-Christians. In fact, a close reading of 
Spe Salvi will reveal that a thoroughly Ratzingerian inclusivism is at work, including elements 
from both the subjective and objective aspects of Ratzingerʼs preferred theory. At the same time, 
Ratzingerʼs inclusivism is extended to include the dynamics of the judgment in the hereafter. 
 
                                                          
65 ʻThe Christian Life is Not an Idea But a Life.ʼ 
Benedict XVIʼs Inclusivist Interpretation of Purgatory 
 
Ratzinger first published Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life66 in 1977, as a part of a project to 
produce a dogmatic theology in a small, paperback format. In his 1998 autobiography, Ratzinger 
describes Eschatology as his ʻmost thorough workʼ, in which he was able to say ʻsomething new 
and yet completely within the faith of the Churchʼ.67 In Last Testament, Pope Benedict confesses 
that what he considered about eschatology in general and purgatory in particular has greatly 
helped him in facing the prospect of death.68 This shows that Ratzingerʼs interpretation of 
purgatory is not merely a matter of academic speculation but a deeply-held theological 
conviction, which helps explain why Benedict XVI goes so far as to incorporate a version of the 
interpretation in an official papal encyclical. 
 In Eschatology, after an investigation of the history of the theology of purgatory, 
Ratzinger formulates his contemporary understanding in the following words: 
 
Purgatory is not. . . some kind of supra-worldly concentration camp where man is forced to 
undergo punishment in a more or less arbitrary fashion. Rather is it the inwardly necessary 
process of transformation in which a person becomes capable of Christ, capable of God and thus 
capable of unity with the whole communion of saints. Simply to look at people with any degree 
of realism at all is to grasp the necessity of such a process. It does not replace grace by works, 
but allows the former to achieve its full victory precisely as grace. What actually saves is the full 
assent of faith. But in most of us, that basic option is buried under a great deal of wood, hay and 
straw. . . Man is the recipient of divine mercy, yet this does not exonerate him from the need of 
                                                          
66 Joseph Ratzinger, Eschatology – Death and Eternal Life, 2nd edition, trans. Michael 
Waldstein (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1988.) 
67 Joseph Ratzinger, Milestones: Memoirs 1927–1977, trans. Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005), p. 150. 
68 Benedict XVI & Seewald, Last Testament, p. 12. 
being transformed. Encounter with the Lord is this transformation. It is the fire that burns away 
our dross and re-forms us to be vessels of eternal joy.69 
 
In this text we find familiar elements of Ratzingerian soteriology. Salvation is transformation by 
grace through faith as well as entrance into communion with God, Christ, the church, the 
communion of saints. But in ʻmost of usʼ, the assent of faith is feeble and the transformation 
incomplete, wherefore a purging encounter with the Lord becomes necessary before entrance 
into eternal joy. Although non-Christians are not explicitly spoken of in Eschatology (the text 
only speaks about ʻusʼ, which might be interpreted as Christians), it is clear that Ratzingerʼs 
interpretation of purgatory is open to an inclusivist application, as made patent in Spe Salvi. 
 In the afterword to the English edition of Eschatology, published in 1988, Ratzinger 
brings up the insufficient attention given to his reinterpretation of purgatory: ʻI also tried to give 
the question of Purgatory a new twist, on the basis of Scripture and Fathers, and to put it in its 
ecumenical context. It would give me pleasure if this part of my study were also discussed and 
proved able to stimulate wider reflection.ʼ70 This sheds more light on the reason why Benedict 
XVI wished to restate his interpretation in a papal encyclical in 2007.71  
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 In the meanwhile, an important step was taken in Catholic theology with regard to the 
doctrine of purgatory and the theology of religions. In 1992, Ratzingerʼs future colleague at the 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Joseph Augustine DiNoia, suggested that the concept 
of purgatory can be applied to the salvation of non-Christians: ʻthere is no reason in principle to 
rule it out for non-Christiansʼ, for according to Catholic doctrine ʻpurgatory provides for an 
interval for the rectification of whatever is lacking in any human being who dies justified or in 
the state of grace, but unprepared for the full enjoyment of blissʼ.72 
 Against this background, we can now consider the restatement of Ratzingerʼs 
interpretation of purgatory in the 2007 encyclical Spe Salvi. In the section titled ʻJudgment as a 
setting for learning and practising hopeʼ, Pope Benedict XVI first presents the extreme cases of 
people who have ʻtotally destroyed their desire for truth and readiness to loveʼ and those who 
ʻare utterly pure, completely permeated by Godʼ – those whose immediate destinies upon death 
are hell and heaven, respectively. Then, with reference to 1 Cor 3:12–15, the pope writes: 
 
Yet we know from experience that neither case is normal in human life. For the great majority of 
people—we may suppose—there remains in the depths of their being an ultimate interior 
openness to truth, to love, to God. In the concrete choices of life, however, it is covered over by 
ever new compromises with evil—much filth covers purity, but the thirst for purity remains and 
it still constantly re-emerges from all that is base and remains present in the soul. What happens 
to such individuals when they appear before the Judge? Will all the impurity they have amassed 
through life suddenly cease to matter? What else might occur? . . . Some recent theologians are 
of the opinion that the fire which both burns and saves is Christ himself, the Judge and Saviour. 
The encounter with him is the decisive act of judgement. Before his gaze all falsehood melts 
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away. This encounter with him, as it burns us, transforms and frees us, allowing us to become 
truly ourselves.73 
 
More explicitly than in Eschatology, Benedict XVI now applies his interpretation of purgatory to 
ʻthe great majority of peopleʼ in general. The pope is not speaking only about the Christian life 
but about ʻhuman lifeʼ, evidently including non-Christians. The decisive ʻultimate interior 
openness to truth, to love, to Godʼ unmistakably echoes the many Ratzingerian statements about 
the subjective aspect of the salvation examined in the previous section. Even more interestingly, 
Benedict XVI also relates the purgatorial solution to the objective aspect. Already in 
Eschatology, Ratzinger had argued that purgatory cannot simply be an individual event that 
would rule out ʻall replacement or substitutionʼ, for ʻthe being of man is not, in fact, that of a 
closed monadʼ.74 In Spe Salvi he returns to the question in the following words:   
 
Now a further question arises: if “Purgatory” is simply purification through fire in the encounter 
with the Lord, Judge and Saviour, how can a third person intervene. . .? When we ask such a 
question, we should recall that no man is an island, entire of itself. Our lives are involved with 
one another, through innumerable interactions they are linked together. No one lives alone. No 
one sins alone. No one is saved alone. The lives of others continually spill over into mine: in 
what I think, say, do and achieve. And conversely, my life spills over into that of others: for 
better and for worse. So my prayer for another is not something extraneous to that person, 
something external, not even after death. . . In this way we further clarify an important element 
of the Christian concept of hope. Our hope is always essentially also hope for others; only thus is 
it truly hope for me too. As Christians we should never limit ourselves to asking: how can I save 
myself? We should also ask: what can I do in order that others may be saved and that for them 
too the star of hope may rise?75 
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Here elements of Ratzingerʼs theology of Stellvertretung extend to the afterlife as well. 
Christians are not supposed to hope only for their own salvation but also for the salvation of 
others, and they can help others reach it not simply by evangelising or converting them but also 
by praying for them, even after their death. Ratzingerʼs interpretation of purgatory thus 
completes his inclusivist theory, bringing the subjective and objective aspects together in the 




In What It Means to Be a Christian, the young Joseph Ratzinger expresses a conviction that God 
is able to save non-Christians and that ʻwe do not need to help him do it with our cogitationsʼ.76 
Decades later, in Truth and Tolerance, Ratzinger asks: ʻDo we necessarily have to invent a 
theory about how God can save people without abandoning the uniqueness of Christ?ʼ77 He 
suggests that ʻthe highest respect for the mystery of Godʼs activityʼ should always be the guide in 
approaching a question ʻthat can in fact be decided only by him who shall judge the worldʼ.78 At 
one point, it seems that Ratzinger would only be willing to offer thoughts about how non-
Christians might achieve righteousness in this world, whereas in terms of the judgment in the 
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hereafter, ʻwhat God makes of the poor broken pieces of our attempts at good, at approaching 
him, remains his secret, which we ought not to presume to try to work outʼ.79 
 Despite all these caveats, we have seen that Ratzinger does in fact offer a rather 
comprehensive theory about the salvation of non-Christians, including both a subjective aspect 
(an openness to God who is always present in the human conscience with his call to self-
transcending faith and love) and an objective aspect (the vicarious representation of Christus 
totus for the salvation of ʻthe Manyʼ), and extending from this life to the next (purgatory). 
 It has been demonstrated that Joseph Ratzinger/Benedict XVI has been a consistent 
soteriological inclusivist since the turn of the 1960s until his retirement as Pope Emeritus. In 
more precise terms, following Gavin DʼCostaʼs classification, Joseph Ratzinger can be 
characterized as a restrictivist inclusivist, which means that he restricts Godʼs salvific work in 
followers of other religions primarily to their conscience and secondarily to the impetus given by 
certain positive elements in their religions, not to the various religious systems per se. At the 
same time, it must be emphasized that restrictivist inclusivism implies no restriction upon the 
number of the saved. 
 Indeed, a restrictive inclusivist can equally well be a pessimistic inclusivist or an 
optimistic inclusivist. The former would hold that only a few non-Christians are in fact saved, 
whereas the latter would hold that a great many non-Christians are saved. Here it is clear that – 
perhaps contrary to popular imagination – Ratzinger emerges as a strong soteriological optimist. 
He believes that non-Christians who are helped by their religions to attain salvation are not a rare 
exception but that this ʻhappens on a large scaleʼ.80 With his interpretation of purgatory, Benedict 
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XVI can suppose that ʻthe great majority of peopleʼ finally make their way to heaven through the 
purifying encounter with Christ.81 Against Ambrose Mongʼs claim that an Augustinian 
pessimism shapes Ratzingerʼs negative attitude toward religious pluralism,82 it should rather be 
said with Robert Barron that Spe Salvi – like Ratzingerʼs soteriological inclusivism as a whole – 
offers perspectives ʻinfinitely more generous than anything in the Augustinian traditionʼ.83 
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